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the meaning of the Taxation Administration Act 1953, nor is it an advance opinion of the 
Commissioner of Taxation. 
 iii
THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
This study tested the effectiveness of different styles of reminder letters that reminded 
taxpayers of their requirement to lodge Activity Statements (AS) to report about tax 
instalments and withholding obligations, Goods and Services Tax or other business-related 
taxes. Specifically, it tested whether reminder letters that were based on principles of 
procedural fairness would yield more positive reactions from taxpayers and greater rates of 
compliance compared to the standard letter used by the Australian Taxation Office (Tax 
Office). Overall, the evidence was weak and inconsistent, however there were some 
promising results that indicate the usefulness of a procedural justice approach and 
encourage further work. 
 
The alternative styles of reminder letters tested in this study were based on the assumption 
that taxpayers are concerned about the procedural fairness of their treatment by tax 
authorities. More specifically, one letter was designed to correspond to the principle of 
informational fairness (transparency and justifications of decisions); another letter was 
meant to realise interpersonal fairness (consideration and respect); a third letter was the 
Tax Office standard letter. In addition, letters referred to the Taxpayers’ Charter and either 
explicitly to the Tax Offices’ commitment to taxpayers’ right to informational fairness, 
their right to interpersonal fairness, or to no specific right. Combining the three letter 
versions and the three different references to the Taxpayers’ Charter, nine different letters 
were compared altogether. It was predicted that fair letters and the commitment to fairness 
rights would each contribute to compliance; but a letter matching a corresponding right 
was predicted to have most positive effects.  
 
Each letter was sent to a random sample of 500 taxpayers (excluding large companies and 
clients registered with a tax agent for AS purposes), who failed to lodge their quarterly AS 
for December 2001 on time. Subsequent client phone calls relating to the reminder letter 
were documented and categorised by Tax Office staff in terms of their prominent issues. 
Four to five weeks after issuing the reminder letter, tax records were accessed for 
taxpayers’ status as to their lodgment of the AS and, if relevant, payment of taxes owed. 
 
The results were not very consistent. However, both the informational and interpersonal 
letter yielded greater lodgment compliance of individuals compared to the standard letter. 
Granting an interpersonal right yielded somewhat greater lodgment compliance of non-
individual entities. Moreover, an informational letter matching an informational right 
yielded fewer accusations and blaming in phone calls and more payment compliance of 
individuals. However, it yielded somewhat less lodgment compliance of non-individual 
entities. 
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Principles of procedural fairness in reminder letters: A field-experiment 
Michael Wenzel 
 
Introduction 
 
Dealing with a huge number of clients, the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) often 
needs to resort to automated actions to inform taxpayers about their tax obligations and to 
encourage them to comply with the laws. Thus, like many other regulatory institutions, the 
Tax Office uses standardised letters, such as reminder letters where taxpayers fail to fulfil 
their tax obligations by a certain deadline. The sheer volume of these letters renders their 
effectiveness and design important issues. 
 
Usually the explicit or implicit principles for the design of reminder letters appear to be  
(1) brevity and conciseness, and (2) firmness and pressure. The former are based on the 
assumptions that taxpayers do not properly read, understand or act upon longer letters, and, 
taxpayers value, and have indeed a right to, have their compliance costs (which includes 
the reading of letters) kept to a minimum (Tax Office, 1997). The latter principles are 
based on the assumption that the Tax Office needs to take a firm stand and point to 
possible negative consequences, so as to deter from continued non-compliance.  
 
While these assumptions may be valid to some extent, they might not be the only, nor even 
the most important, concerns that taxpayers have in their dealings with the Tax Office. In 
fact, regarding deterrence as a regulatory strategy, in a recent study by Slemrod, 
Blumenthal and Christian (2001) a threatening letter announcing an audit program only 
had positive effects on tax reporting for some taxpayer groups while it backfired for others. 
Likewise, in a survey study (Wenzel, in press), I found that, under certain conditions, 
taxpayers did not seem concerned about negative consequences and perceived deterrence, 
but were more concerned about the fairness of their treatment. This is consistent with 
Tyler’s view (2001) that experiences of fairness in interactions with authorities increase 
perceptions of legitimacy of the authorities; and when authorities are considered legitimate, 
people are more likely to comply with them. Reminder letters are a form of treatment by an 
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authority and, hence, taxpayers might be concerned about the procedural fairness of the 
letters. 
 
In an earlier paper (Wenzel, 2001), I argued that two principles of procedural fairness in 
particular might be relevant to reminder letters. First, a principle of informational justice 
(Greenberg, 1993) refers to the transparency of, and the provision of information and 
explanations about, decision procedures and decisions (for example, the decision to send 
out a reminder letter). This principle implies that the authority is accountable to taxpayers 
and does not wield arbitrary or despotic, but rather informed, neutral and well-considered 
decisions. The principle also acknowledges the status of taxpayers as emancipated citizens 
who are not servants to, but rather served by, their democratic institutions. Second, a 
principle of interpersonal justice (Greenberg, 1993) refers to politeness and respect, 
sensitivity to people’s feelings and consideration of their circumstances. The principle thus 
implies that the authority owes to all people respect of their worth and rights, independent 
of any substantive conflicts. The principle again acknowledges the standing of taxpayers as 
equal citizens and their worth as human beings (Tyler, 1989). 
 
If people are indeed concerned about the fairness of their treatment, as we predict,        
(H1) taxpayers will respond more favourably to a reminder letter message that corresponds 
to either informational or interpersonal principles of fairness compared with a standard 
reminder letter.  
 
Similarly, it is possible that taxpayers already respond favourably to the Tax Office 
explicitly granting taxpayers the entitlement to these two forms of procedural fairness. In 
1997, the Tax Office introduced a Taxpayers’ Charter that outlines ‘the legal rights and 
standards taxpayers can expect from the Tax Office’ (Tax Office, 1997, p. 8). These 
reflect, next to others, the two principles of informational justice (‘explaining our decisions 
to you’, p. 13) and interpersonal justice (‘treat you with courtesy, consideration and 
respect’, p. 8). The charter is an acknowledgement of taxpayer rights that in itself could 
induce trust in the Tax Office’s commitment to these rights. Hence, we predict that (H2) 
taxpayers will respond more favourably to a reminder letter that contains a reference to 
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either informational or interpersonal principles of fairness as outlined in the Taxpayers’ 
Charter.  
 
However, such an assertion of a commitment to taxpayer rights may sound hollow if is not 
actually realised in the same communication, that is, if the message of the reminder letter 
does not correspond to the taxpayer right referred to. Conversely, a letter message that 
realises a certain principle of procedural fairness may be considered even fairer, if 
taxpayers are made aware of the respective principle and their entitlement to such 
treatment (see Heuer Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999). For these reasons, we 
further predict that the procedural fairness of the letter message and the self-stated 
commitment to principles of procedural fairness will interact in their effects on taxpayers’ 
responses to the letter (H3): if the justice principles realised in the letter message 
correspond to the procedural right to which the Tax Office expresses its commitment, then 
taxpayers will respond to the reminder letter most favourably. 
 
Indeed, in an earlier scenario study (Wenzel, 2001), university students evaluated a 
reminder letter that realised principles of informational justice as being fairer when the 
right to informational justice had been made salient; and they evaluated a reminder letter 
that realised principles of interpersonal justice as being fairer when the right to 
interpersonal justice had been made salient. The present study builds on these findings and 
investigates whether these perceptions of greater fairness actually translate into greater 
rates of taxpayer compliance. Specifically, we will investigate whether reminder letters 
that embody principles of procedural fairness, in interaction with the explicit granting of 
corresponding procedural rights, lead to greater levels of compliance with the letter. 
 
Study 
 
In July 2000, Tax Reform in Australia introduced wide-ranging changes to the Australian 
tax system, including a Goods and Services Tax (GST), a new system for tax instalments 
and changes in withholding tax on behalf of others (Pay As You Go, PAYG). With these 
changes came a new reporting system in the form of Activity Statements (AS), which have 
to be lodged monthly, quarterly or yearly, depending on the circumstances. Business 
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Activity Statements (BAS) have to be used by businesses to report on, among other things, 
GST and/or PAYG instalments payable to the Tax Office. Instalment Activity Statements 
(IAS) are required for PAYG instalments only. With the lodgment of AS, taxpayers are 
required to make their payments (if necessary).  
 
The first year after the introduction of Tax Reform was considered a transitional period 
where the Tax Office was lenient with regard to the on-time lodgment of AS. However, 
because AS should have become more routine practice since then, the Tax Office has 
started to use regulatory measures to ensure the timely and correct lodgment of AS. 
Specifically, the Tax Office uses reminder letters to remind taxpayers of their obligations 
and to encourage them to lodge their AS. The standard AS reminder letter is rather 
straightforward, brief and firm. There appeared to be considerable scope to design 
alternative letters that use and refer to principles of procedural fairness and, thus, to test 
our hypotheses in this context.  
 
The effects of the different reminder letters will be evaluated, first, on the basis of the 
number and quality of phone calls from clients. A lower number of phone calls could 
indicate that taxpayers are more satisfied with their treatment, feel less resentment and are 
less inclined to protest. Moreover, phone calls are a cost factor for the Tax Office, 
requiring staff, time and resources, and from this perspective letters that reduce the number 
of return calls are more efficient. However, the meaning of the mere number of calls might 
be ambiguous, because a fairer letter (in particular one that refers to the Tax Office’s 
commitment to provide explanations) could also encourage taxpayers to call the Tax 
Office. The fact, that clients call up could indicate that they think positively of the Tax 
Office, as an organisation one can talk to. Moreover, if there were any complaints it would 
be better for the Tax Office to know about them, rather than being subject to silent non-
compliance. Hence, the quality of the phone calls should be a more meaningful indicator of 
the quality of reminder letters. A reduction in the number of angry phone calls, where 
taxpayers complain or blame the Tax Office, would indicate greater client satisfaction with 
the letter. 
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Second, the effects of the reminder letters will be evaluated on the basis of lodgment and 
payment records. Reminder letters are more effective when they produce a higher rate of 
compliance; that is, when clients lodge their AS without much further delay and when they 
pay the taxes they owe. 
 
It is likely that letters appealing to fairness are only effective when the responsible 
taxpayers themselves receive the letter, rather than their professional preparers. 
Professional preparers who deal with tax matters on behalf of their clients (1) are not 
personally addressed in the letters and the fair treatment demonstrated in the letters would 
not apply to them. Also, (2) their professional attitude may make them less susceptible to 
fairness appeals and, instead, (3) they may feel a professional obligation to look after the 
material interests of their clients, rather than their feelings of fairness or esteem. For these 
reasons, the present study focused on taxpayers who were not registered with a tax agent or 
accountant. 
 
Moreover, various taxpayer entities have to lodge AS: individuals, partnerships, trusts, 
companies and superannuation funds. While the present study uses a random sample of 
clients across these different entities, where the records indicate an obligation to lodge an 
AS, it is plausible that reminder letters appealing to fairness will be particularly effective 
with individual clients. This is so, again, because non-individual entities might be 
employing tax experts who are professional and mainly accountable (to others) for 
securing the financial interests of the entity. In contrast, individuals (who are not registered 
with a tax accountant) are more likely to deal with their tax matters themselves. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
For the present study, 4500 cases were randomly selected from the population of taxpayers 
who, according to Tax Office records, were expected to lodge, but had not lodged, a 
quarterly AS for the third quarter of 2001. These clients had not yet been contacted by the 
Tax Office regarding their outstanding AS. We expected the style of reminder letters to 
matter more when taxpayers themselves, rather than professional preparers, were the 
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recipients of the letter. Hence, the present study focused on taxpayers who were not 
registered with a tax agent or accountant for the handling of their AS. Note, however, that 
taxpayers may be registered with tax agents or accountants for other tax purposes (for 
example, their income tax returns). Moreover, large business clients usually use the 
services of external accountants or internal tax departments, and for this reason we 
excluded the Large Enterprises segment from our sampling population and focused on 
Micro-Business, Small/Medium Enterprises and Not-for-Profit Organisations. Further 
sampling restrictions were meant to avoid confusions as to the obligation to which the 
reminder letter referred: (a) clients had only ever had quarterly obligations; (b) clients had 
no other AS outstanding; (c) clients had only one known concurrent AS obligation. Finally, 
clients from Western Australia were excluded from the experiment. 
 
The data showed that 27 reminder letters were returned to sender unclaimed. Also,         
365 taxpayers lodged their AS before they received the reminder letters, due to a natural 
delay between sampling and issuing the letters. Because the reminder letters obviously 
could not have any effect in these situations, the number of valid cases was reduced to 
4108. Four further cases were excluded from analyses because of their unusual status: three 
cases had yet outstanding AS from the previous quarter, and one case was an overseas 
company (valid N = 4104). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
The 4500 taxpayers sampled were randomly assigned to the nine groups of a 3x3 design 
with the factors letter (informational/interpersonal/standard) and salient right 
(informational/interpersonal/none salient). The factor letter referred to three different letter 
bodies that either incorporated principles of informational or interpersonal justice or no 
such principles. The factor right referred to an additional message at the bottom of the 
letter that highlighted the taxpayers right to informational or interpersonal justice, or no 
such reference was included in the letter. 
 
The taxpayers sampled for our study were due to receive a reminder letter encouraging 
them to lodge their third quarter AS and make respective payments if necessary. However, 
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instead of the standard Tax Office reminder letter, they were sent one of the nine letter 
versions designed for the purpose of this study. To reduce strain on Tax Office staff, due to 
taxpayers calling and making requests, the 4500 letters were sent out in two batches. A 
first random half of the letters were sent out about six weeks after the lodgment deadline, 
the second half was sent out a week later. Tax Office staff answering the incoming phone 
calls recorded the content of the calls in a category system. About five and four weeks after 
issuing the reminder letters, respectively, Tax Office records were accessed again for 
lodgment status and other relevant taxpaying data. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The factor letter referred to three different bodies of the reminder letters (see Appendix). 
One version attempted to realise informational justice by restructuring and expanding on 
the standard letter text under three headings. These headings were given in the form of 
questions: (1) ‘Why are we sending you this letter?’; (2) ‘Why can’t we be more specific in 
this letter?’; and (3) ‘Why do we impose penalties?’ These were considered to be three 
relevant issues on which taxpayers might desire more information, transparency and 
explanation. The provision of respective details should increase perceptions of 
informational fairness, as shown in a pre-study (Wenzel, 2001). A second version 
attempted to realise interpersonal justice, again, by restructuring and expanding on the text 
of the standard letter under three headings. The headings this time summed up the message 
of the respective paragraphs: (1) ‘We believe in your honesty’; (2) ‘We acknowledge that 
times can be difficult’; and (3) ‘We do not want to make things more difficult for you’. 
These were meant to address taxpayers’ concern for respectful treatment; namely by 
assuring taxpayers of the Tax Office’s trust in their honesty, showing consideration for the 
taxpayers’ situation and emphasising the Tax Office’s benevolence or lack of malevolence 
(Wenzel, 2001). A third letter version (standard) was basically identical to the Tax Office 
standard letter (except for some minor changes for the purposes of the study, such as the 
inclusion of special contact phone numbers). 
 
The factor right was realised by the inclusion of an additional message, at the bottom of 
the letter, that referred to the Taxpayers’ Charter. It provided a short definition of what the 
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Taxpayers’ Charter was as well as some information on how it could be obtained and 
where it could be accessed on the Internet. In addition, in the informational justice 
condition, the message highlighted one particular right from the Taxpayers’ Charter (‘You 
have a right to have Tax Office decisions about your tax affairs explained to you’) that 
corresponds to the definition of informational justice. In the interpersonal justice condition, 
the message highlighted a right from the Taxpayers’ Charter (‘You have a right to be 
treated by the ATO with courtesy, consideration and respect’) that corresponds to the 
definition of interpersonal justice. In the no salient right condition, no particular right was 
mentioned and only the general definition and information was provided (as is the case in 
the Tax Office standard letter). The Appendix gives three examples of the nine letters used: 
informational letter/informational right, interpersonal letter/interpersonal right and standard 
letter/no salient right. 
 
Phone Calls 
 
The reminder letters used in the present study all included a specifically designated phone 
number that taxpayers could call for enquiries, clarification or comment. Each of the nine 
letters also contained a reference number that identified the kind of letter taxpayers had 
received. Thus, Tax Office staff receiving phone calls from taxpayers referring to the 
reminder letter were instructed to ask taxpayers for the reference number and to record it 
together with other information about the phone call. Specifically, Tax Office staff 
categorised the content of the call in one or more of six categories: (1) penalties or Tax 
Office actions, (2) excuse or assurance of lodgment, (3) accusation or blame on Tax 
Office, (4) request for information or assistance, (5) request for delay (of lodgment or 
payment), and (6) other issues (in an open format for further specification).1 In addition, 
Tax Office staff were instructed to rate the caller’s aggressiveness or friendliness on four 
five-point rating scales: aggressive, angry, polite and cooperative (1 = not at all, 5 = very). 
The four items were highly correlated; thus, the two positive items were reverse-scored and 
the four items averaged to obtain scale scores ( = 0.89). 
 
                                                 
1 A seventh category was meant to indicate whether or not taxpayers commented positively or negatively on 
the tone of the letter they had received. However, Tax Office staff mistakenly used this category to indicate 
the tone that the caller displayed. Hence, this category was dropped from further analyses. 
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Tax Data 
 
Tax records were accessed four/five weeks after issuing the reminder letters (our self-set 
deadline). Of primary interest was the taxpayers’ degree of compliance with the reminder 
letters. There were two aspects of compliance.  
 
Lodgment. The first measure of compliance, which applied to all cases, referred to the 
lodgment of the AS. The tax records distinguished between seven different outcomes that 
were categorised into a binary variable of lodgment compliance. We defined as non-
compliant a taxpayer who did not lodge their AS by the deadline, either their original AS 
or a replacement AS (for example, when the original AS was reported lost). We defined as 
compliant all taxpayers (1) who lodged their (original or replacement) AS by the deadline, 
regardless of it being already fully processed or received but not yet fully processed; or   
(2) whose AS was discontinued (for example, taxpayers informed the Tax Office that their 
business had ceased). 
 
Payment. A second measure of compliance referred to cases where an AS had been lodged 
and processed, and the net value of the AS showed a debit amount. We defined taxpayers 
who did not pay by the deadline the tax they owed as non-compliant, and taxpayers who 
paid the amount owed as compliant. Cases where taxpayers had made payments before 
they received the reminder letter were excluded from the analysis. (Some taxpayers made 
their payments before the reminder letters were issued but did not lodge their AS, either 
because they forgot or they thought they were not required to do so.) 
 
Other variables were of interest because controlling for them would increase the statistical 
power of the analyses. In particular, taxpayers’ lodgment history should be relevant in this 
context, as it should account for a considerable amount of the variance in lodgment 
compliance. 
 
Lodgment history. Taxpayers’ history of compliance in lodging AS was captured in four 
categorical variables for the four preceding lodgment quarters since the introduction of Tax 
Reform: Sep2000, Dec2000, Mar2001 and Jun2001. The variables contained four 
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categories: (1) the client had no obligation to lodge for that period; (2) the client lodged on 
time (on or before the due date); (3) the client lodged within seven days after the due date; 
or (4) the client lodged late (eight or more days after the due date). Three cases where the 
June 2001 AS was still outstanding were excluded from the analysis, because of potential 
biases due to this underrepresented category. 
 
Entity type. Tax records distinguished between five categories of client entities, which 
were represented in the present analyses as follows: 2052 individuals, 774 partnerships, 
223 trusts, 970 companies and 85 superannuation funds. Following our reasoning that the 
reminder letters might be more effective with individuals, the entity type was defined as a 
binary variable with the categories individuals (N = 2052) and non-individuals (including 
partnerships, trusts, companies and superannuation funds; N = 2052).  
 
Batch. As described earlier, for practical reasons, the reminder letters were sent out in two 
random batches one week apart. This meant that for the second batch of taxpayers the time 
of data access (which was the same for all cases) was one week earlier than for the first 
batch, relative to the date of issue of reminder letters. Hence, compliance was somewhat 
more strictly defined for the second than the first batch, and this could have implications 
for levels of compliance. 
 
Tax agent for AS purposes. Although cases were sampled from the population of taxpayers 
who, according to previous records, were not registered with a tax agent or accountant for 
purposes of their AS preparation, 43 taxpayers changed their status and became registered 
for the quarter in question. 
 
Tax agent for income tax purposes. Most clients not only have AS obligations but also 
income tax obligations, for which however they could have an extra ‘role’ in the Tax 
Office’s records. Most taxpayers, namely 3370, were registered with a tax agent or 
accountant for the purpose of income taxation, while 734 were not, partly because they did 
not have an income tax role (n = 88). 
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Gender. For individuals only, the client’s gender was included as a background variable. 
There were 77.6% male and 22.4% female individual clients. 
 
Age. Again, for individuals only, the client’s age was included as a background variable, 
ranging from 16 to 88, with a median age of 40. 
 
Business age. For non-individuals, the age of the business was included as a background 
variable. Due to the nature of Tax Office records, it was not possible to have a valid age for 
all businesses that were older than 10 years. As a consequence, businesses that were 10 or 
more years old were all given a value of 10. 
 
Other. Other variables were inspected for their possible influences on levels of compliance, 
such as the type of AS (BAS vs. IAS), the turnover of the business, and the location (urban 
vs. rural vs. remote). However, these variables did not play any role in the analyses and 
will be ignored in the remainder of the paper. 
 
Results 
Phone Calls 
 
The phone records showed that 1094 calls were received (four further calls lacked details 
on the experimental condition and had to be ignored). Table 1 shows the distribution of 
phone calls across the nine letter conditions. Chi-square tests indicated no significant 
interactive pattern of the two factors letter and right, χ2(4) = 5.17, ns. However, there was a 
close to significant main effect of letter, χ2(2) = 5.68, p = 0.058, while right had no 
significant effect, χ2(2) =0.30, ns. As the marginal sums in Table 1 show, there were fewer 
calls following the informational letter (n = 337) than the interpersonal letter (n = 400), 
with the standard letter falling in between (n = 357). 
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Table 1: Frequencies of phone calls  
 
Letter  
 informational interpersonal standard Total 
 n 
(column%) 
(row%) n 
(column%)
(row%) n 
(column%)
(row%) n 
(column%) 
Right        
informational 99 
(29.4) 
(26.5) 141 
(35.3) 
(37.8) 133 
(37.3) 
(35.7) 373 
(34.1) 
interpersonal 120 
(35.6) 
(33.1) 130 
(32.5) 
(35.9) 112 
(31.4) 
(30.9) 362 
(33.1) 
none salient 118 
(35.0) 
(32.9) 129 
(32.3) 
(35.9) 112 
(31.4) 
(31.2) 359 
(32.8) 
Total
 
337 
 
(30.8) 
 
400 
 
(36.6) 
 
357 
 
(32.6) 
 
1094 
Note. For the complete cross-tabulation, χ2(4) = 5.17, ns; for letter, χ2(2) = 5.68, p = 0.058; for right, χ2(2) = 
0.30, ns. 
 
 
Out of 1094 calls, 43 referred to penalties or Tax Office actions, 644 contained excuses or 
assurances, 70 made accusations or blamed the Tax Office, 91 requested information and 
69 requested a delay. The 621 entries under ‘other issues’ were mainly elaborations of 
these five specific categories, but included also a number of calls that claimed the AS had 
already been lodged or that provided reasons for non-lodgment (for example, business had 
been sold).  
 
Separate hierarchical log-linear models were calculated for the five specific categories of 
call content, involving the factors letter, right and the respective content category (see 
Table 2). First, there were no significant associations between letter, right and the fact that 
a phone call referred to penalties and Tax Office actions.  
 
Second, there was a marginally significant association between right and the fact that a 
phone call contained excuses or assurances, partial χ2(2) = 5.63, p = 0.060. There was a 
lower proportion of excuses and assurances in the informational right condition (54.7%) 
compared to the no salient right condition (63.2%), with the interpersonal right letter being 
in between (58.8%). Similarly, there was a significant association between right and  
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request for delay, partial χ2(2) = 7.06, p = 0.029. There were fewer requests for delays 
when the reminder letter highlighted an informational right (3.8%) compared to the no 
salient right condition (8.4%); the interpersonal right condition fell again in between 
(6.9%).  
 
Table 2: Log-linear models for the five specified categories of phone call content  
 
 Phone Call Content Category 
 penalties/ 
ATO actions 
excuses/ 
assurances 
accusations/ 
blame 
request for 
information 
request for 
delay 
 χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p 
BY…           
letter by right 
(df = 4) 
2.19 ns 1.95 ns 8.05 0.09 10.98 0.027 2.01 ns 
letter 
(df = 2) 
2.08 ns 0.53 ns 1.00 ns 14.61 0.10 0.88 ns 
right 
(df = 2) 
2.36 ns 5.63 0.060 2.77 ns 13.02 ns 7.06 0.029 
Note. Only the relevant results referring to the 3-way association (category by letter by right) and the two 2-
way associations (category by letter; category by right) are reported here. 
 
 
Third, the log-linear model for accusations or blame yielded a marginally significant three-
way effect, L.R. χ2(4) = 8.05, p = 0.090. To further explore this result, chi-square tests 
were used to test for effects of letter within the different levels of right. The results are 
shown in Table 3. Only in the informational right condition was there a significant effect of 
letter, χ2(2) = 5.99, p = 0.050. Namely, accusations and blame were lower when the letter 
was informationally fair and thus matched the right made salient in the letter, compared to 
the standard letter (the interpersonal letter being in between). However, matching the 
interpersonal right with an interpersonal letter did not produce an equivalent effect. 
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Table 3: Frequencies of accusations or blame in phone calls  
 
Letter 
  informational interpersonal standard 
  n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Right        
 informational acc./blame – no
yes
97 
2 
(98.0) 
(2.0) 
133 
8 
(94.3) 
(5.7) 
120 
13 
(90.2) 
(9.8) 
 interpersonal acc./blame – no
yes
111 
9 
(92.5) 
(7.5) 
118 
12 
(90.8) 
(9.2) 
104 
8 
(92.9) 
(7.1) 
 none salient acc./blame – no
yes
111 
7 
(94.1) 
(5.9) 
121 
8 
(93.8) 
(6.2) 
109 
3 
(97.3) 
(2.7) 
Note. Effect of letter within informational right, χ2(2) = 5.99, p = 0.050; effect of letter within interpersonal 
right, χ2(2) = 0.42, ns; effect of letter within no salient right, χ2(2) = 1.87, ns. 
 
The analysis for requests for information also yielded a significant three-way effect, L.R. 
χ2(4) = 10.98, p = 0.027. Again, to illustrate the finding, the effects of letter were tested by 
chi-square tests for the different levels of right. The results are shown in Table 4. Only in 
the informational right condition was there a significant effect of letter, χ2(2) = 10.15,        
p = 0.006. The proportion of requests for information was higher with the informational 
letter that matched the informational right, compared to the interpersonal and standard 
letters. 
 
Finally, the ratings of the caller’s aggressiveness showed a grand mean rating of 1.09 on a 
scale from 1 to 5. The vast majority of calls were thus very friendly, cooperative and 
without resentment. It is therefore not surprising that an analysis of variance for this 
variable did not reveal any significant effects of the experimental factors, Fs < 2.31, ns.  
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Table 4: Frequencies of requests for information in phone calls  
 
Letter 
  informational interpersonal standard 
  n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Right        
 informational req. for info – no
yes
86 
13 
(86.9) 
(13.1) 
136 
5 
(96.5) 
(3.5) 
127 
6 
(95.5) 
(4.5) 
 interpersonal req. for info – no
yes
112 
8 
(93.3) 
(6.7) 
118 
12 
(90.8) 
(9.2) 
101 
11 
(90.2) 
(9.8) 
 none salient req. for info – no
yes
105 
13 
(89.0) 
(11.0) 
122 
7 
(94.6) 
(5.4) 
96 
16 
(85.7) 
(14.3) 
Note. Effect of letter within informational right, χ2(2) = 10.15, p = 0.006; effect of letter within interpersonal 
right, χ2(2) = 0.85, ns; effect of letter within no salient right, χ2(2) = 5.41, p = 0.067. 
 
 
Summary. The data on return phone calls indicated some advantages of reminder letters 
that adopted principles of informational fairness. There tended to be fewer return calls 
overall when the letter message was informationally fair; fewer excuses and fewer requests 
for delayed lodgment when an informational right was granted; and fewer accusations 
when an informational letter matched an informational right. However, the effects were not 
completely clear and rather suggestive. 
 
Lodgment Compliance 
 
A second and important evaluation of the different reminder letter was based on objective 
tax records and actual taxpayer compliance. We investigated whether the letters were 
effective in encouraging clients to lodge their AS without much further delay. First, a 
hierarchical log-linear model was used to test our reasoning that the letter style could have 
a greater impact on compliance for individual clients. We thus tested for associations 
between the binary variable lodgment compliance (no/yes), the experimental factors letter 
and right, and the binary variable entity type (individuals/non-individuals). The results 
showed a marginally significant four-way interaction between all four variables, L.R.    
χ2(4) = 8.06, p = 0.089. All other effects and partial associations were not significant. 
Because this result indicated that entity type indeed moderated the effects of the letters, 
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further analyses were conducted separately for individuals and non-individual entities. The 
following separate analyses also allowed for the inclusion of background variables that 
were specific to the entity types, enabling more powerful analyses. 
 
Individuals. A logistic regression was run to test for the effects of letter and right as well 
as, in a second step, their interactive effects. The analysis also included the following 
background and control variables: the four categorical variables of lodgment history 
(Sep2000, Dec2000, Mar2001 and Jun2001), registration with a tax agent for AS purposes 
(AgentAS), registration with a tax agent for income tax purposes (AgentIT), gender, age 
and batch (that is, time of issuing the letters). The results revealed that the interaction 
between letter and right was not significant, Wald(4) = 2.25, ns, so that we can focus on the 
first step of the analysis.  
 
The findings are presented in Table 5. All the control and background variables had 
significant effects. First, lodgment history proved to be a significant predictor of lodgment 
compliance; in particular the more recent variables, Jun2001 and Mar2001, had significant 
overall effects. Specifically, clients who lodged their previous AS on time, Jun2001(2), 
complied more with the reminder letter, relative to the comparison category of late lodgers 
of the June quarter. Similar positive effects can be seen for a history of lodgment 
compliance in the March 2001 quarter and even the September 2000 quarter. Likewise, 
clients who were marginally compliant in March 2001 and lodged then within seven days, 
Mar2001(3), complied more with the reminder letter than late lodgers of the same quarter. 
The equivalent effect was, however, not significant for the more recent June quarter. 
Another inconsistency between March 2001 and June 2001 quarters referred to the 
category of those who had no lodgment obligations for these quarters. While clients who 
had no obligations in March, Mar2001(1), tended to be more compliant with the reminder 
letter, clients with no obligations in June, Jun2001(1), were significantly less compliant 
compared to the late lodgers of the same quarter. This might indicate that inexperience is 
one factor contributing to lack of compliance. Overall, however, the effects of lodgment 
history demonstrate that compliance problems are, for whatever reasons, partly chronic.  
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Table 5: Logistic regression for lodgment compliance of individuals  
 
  B S.E. Wald df p 
Step1 Sep00   06.179 3 0.103 
  Sep00(1) -0.211 0.272 00.599 1 ns 
  Sep00(2) -0.292 0.135 04.681 1 0.030 
  Sep00(3) -0.076 0.271 00.080 1 ns 
 Dec00   05.815 3 ns 
  Dec00(1) -0.636 0.423 02.263 1 ns 
  Dec00(2) -0.143 0.134 01.144 1 ns 
  Dec00(3) -0.121 0.227 00.281 1 ns 
 Mar01   18.267 3 0.000 
  Mar01(1) -0.754 0.392 03.696 1 0.055 
  Mar01(2) -0.417 0.114 13.332 1 0.000 
  Mar01(3) -0.601 0.194 09.641 1 0.002 
 Jun01   20.595 3 0.002 
  Jun01(1) -1.739 0.857 04.121 1 0.042 
  Jun01(2) -0.397 0.104 14.684 1 0.000 
  Jun01(3) -0.176 0.179 00.967 1 ns 
 AgentAS -0.922 0.530 03.024 1 0.082 
 AgentIT -0.318 0.144 04.851 1 0.028 
 Gender -0.279 0.111 06.338 1 0.012 
 Age -0.016 0.004 16.518 1 0.000 
 Batch -0.358 0.092 15.135 1 0.000 
 Letter   04.653 2 0.098 
  Letter(1) -0.207 0.113 03.359 1 0.067 
  Letter(2) -0.215 0.113 03.641 1 0.056 
 Right   00.164 2 ns 
  Right(1) -0.041 0.113 00.130 1 ns 
  Right(2) -0.003 0.112 00.001 1 ns 
 Constant -1.901 0.284 44.895 1 0.000 
Step 2 …      
 Letter * Right   02.245 4 ns 
  Letter(1) by Right(1) 0.082 0.278 00.086 1 ns 
  Letter(1) by Right(2) 0.186 0.277 00.452 1 ns 
  Letter(2) by Right(1) -0.223 0.277 00.647 1 ns 
  Letter(2) by Right(2) -0.197 0.277 00.506 1 ns 
 Constant -1.925 0.296 42.176 1 0.000 
 
Second, registration with a tax agent or accountant for AS purposes had a marginally 
significant effect (remember, however, that the number of clients who, following their 
previous AS, decided to employ a preparer was rather small). This indicated that clients 
registered with an agent or accountant were more compliant with the reminder letter. 
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Likewise, registration with a tax agent or accountant for income tax purposes had a 
significant effect. Again, clients registered with an agent or accountant were more 
compliant.  
 
Third, gender and age were each significantly related to lodgment compliance. Female 
clients were more compliant than males; and clients were more compliant, the older they 
were. Not surprisingly, whether clients received a reminder letter of the first or the second 
batch impacted on lodgment results. Clients of the first batch, who had more time to 
comply with the letter, had a greater lodgment rate. 
 
Controlling for all these background differences, did the experimental variation of 
reminder letters affect lodgment compliance? The results showed that the factor right did 
not have a significant effect, while the factor letter had, overall, a marginally significant 
effect, Wald(2) = 4.65, p = 0.098. Single comparisons between letters based on principles 
of procedural fairness with the standard letter showed for both the informational (B = 0.21, 
p = 0.067) and the interpersonal justice letter (B = 0.22, p = 0.056) marginally significant 
effects. Compared to the standard letter, each of the ‘procedurally fair’ letters led to greater 
lodgment compliance. 
 
The cross-tabulation of lodgment compliance and ‘fair’ versus control letters may illustrate 
the practical meaning of these effects; however, note that the background variables are here 
no longer accounted for. In the two ‘fair’ letter conditions, 50.5% of clients complied with 
the reminder letter and lodged their AS, while only 45.8% of clients complied who 
received the standard letter. A chi-square test indicated that the difference between the two 
procedurally fair letters together and the standard letter was statistically significant, χ2(1) = 
4.13, p = 0.042. 
 
Non-individuals. For non-individual entities, again, a logistic regression was run to test for 
the effects of letter and right as well as, in a second step, their interactive effects. The 
following background variables were controlled for in the analysis: the four categorical 
variables of lodgment history (Sep2000, Dec2000, Mar2001 and Jun2001), registration 
with a tax agent for AS purposes (AgentAS), registration with a tax agent for income tax 
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purposes (AgentIT), entity (partnership/trust/company/superannuation fund), business age 
and batch. The results showed a significant main effect of right in the first step, Wald(2) = 
6.25, p = 0.044, and a marginally significant overall interaction effect of right and letter in 
the second step, Wald(4) = 8.23, p = 0.083. The results of both steps were therefore 
inspected. 
 
The findings are presented in Table 6. The results for the control and background variables 
did not differ substantially between the two steps (only step 1 results are displayed in  
Table 6). First, lodgment history had very similar effects as in the equivalent analysis for 
individuals, except even stronger and more consistent. For all four previous lodgment 
quarters the effect held that clients who lodged previously on-time (2) were more 
compliant with the reminder letter. In addition, clients who lodged their March AS within 
seven days, and thus marginally on time (3), also complied better with the reminder letter. 
No other effects were significant across both steps. So, again, the results indicate that 
lodgment compliance, or the conditions that bring it about, are relatively stable.  
 
Second, registration with a tax agent or accountant for AS purposes had no effect 
(remember, however, the small number), while registration with a tax agent or accountant 
for income tax purposes had a significant effect. Clients registered with an agent or 
accountant were more compliant. Third, entity had an overall significant effect, Wald(3) = 
8.68, p = 0.034, which was mainly due to partnerships and trusts tending to comply better 
with the reminder letter, relative to the comparison category, superannuation funds. Fourth, 
business age did not have a significant relationship to lodgment compliance. Fifth, 
naturally, clients of the first batch of the letter mail-out, who had more time to comply with 
the letter, had a greater lodgment rate. 
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Table 6: Logistic regression for lodgment compliance of non-individual entities  
 
  B S.E. Wald df p 
Step1 Sep00   10.334 3 0.016 
  Sep00(1) -0.260 0.309 0.711 1 ns 
  Sep00(2) -0.428 0.139 9.532 1 0.002 
  Sep00(3) -0.129 0.266 0.236 1 ns 
 Dec00   5.800 3 ns 
  Dec00(1) -0.669 0.405 2.731 1 0.098 
  Dec00(2) -0.268 0.133 4.067 1 0.044 
  Dec00(3) -0.300 0.217 1.906 1 ns 
 Mar01   27.346 3 0.000 
  Mar01(1) -0.281 0.389 0.524 1 ns 
  Mar01(2) -0.574 0.117 24.192 1 0.000 
  Mar01(3) -0.441 0.186 5.611 1 0.018 
 Jun01   6.771 3 0.080 
  Jun01(1) -0.123 0.949 0.017 1 ns 
  Jun01(2) -0.274 0.106 6.679 1 0.010 
  Jun01(3) -0.155 0.173 0.807 1 ns 
 AgentAS -0.083 0.427 0.038 1 ns 
 AgentIT -0.303 0.117 6.695 1 0.010 
 Entity   8.675 3 0.034 
  Entity(1) -0.401 0.241 2.766 1 0.096 
  Entity(2) -0.419 0.268 2.445 1 ns 
  Entity(3) -0.148 0.238 0.384 1 ns 
 Business age -0.012 0.014 0.755 1 ns 
 Batch -0.334 0.092 13.074 1 0.000 
 Letter   0.009 2 ns 
  Letter(1) -0.009 0.113 0.007 1 ns 
  Letter(2) -0.000 0.113 0.000 1 ns 
 Right   6.249 2 0.044 
  Right(1) -0.070 0.112 0.395 1 ns 
  Right(2) -0.205 0.114 3.247 1 0.072 
 Constant -1.854 0.306 36.703 1 0.000 
Step 2 …      
 Letter * Right   8.234 4 0.083 
  Letter(1) by Right(1) -0.544 0.275 3.917 1 0.048 
  Letter(1) by Right(2) -0.435 0.278 2.456 1 ns 
  Letter(2) by Right(1) -0.167 0.275 0.371 1 ns 
  Letter(2) by Right(2) -0.134 0.279 0.230 1 ns 
 Constant -1.935 0.321 36.305 1 0.000 
 
 
Beyond these background variables, as stated before, the experimental factor right had a 
significant overall effect in the first step. This effect was mainly due to the interpersonal 
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right letter yielding marginally significantly more compliance (B = 0.21, p = 0.072), 
compared to the letter that made no right salient. The informational right letter did not 
differ from the no salient right condition. The marginally significant interaction effect of 
letter and right in the second step was mainly due to the information letter/informational 
right condition. Contrary to the prediction (H3), the matching of informational entitlement 
and treatment did not increase compliance, but rather decreased it (B = -0.54, p = 0.048). 
 
Cross-tabulations further illustrate the practical meaning of these effects; however, note 
that background variables are here no longer controlled. First, the compliance rate in the 
interpersonal right condition was 53.4% compared to 49.5% in the no salient right and 
47.4% in the informational right conditions. The simple chi-square test (not controlling for 
background characteristics) was marginally significant, χ2(2) = 5.00, p = 0.082. Second, 
concerning the interaction effect, the compliance rate following an informational letter was 
42.8% when a matching informational right was made salient compared to 54.6% when no 
right was made salient (interpersonal right: 50.9%). The chi-square test of this effect was 
significant, χ2(2) = 6.79, p = 0.034. 
 
Summary. Lodgment compliance data indicated that the reminder letters had different 
effects on individual and non-individual entities. For non-individual entities, the reference 
to an interpersonal right tended to have a positive impact, but the combination of 
informational message and an informational right being made salient was 
counterproductive. In contrast, for individuals, lodgment compliance tended to be greater 
when the reminder letter messages adopted principles of procedural fairness (either 
informational or interpersonal). This effect is consistent with expectations and the 
procedural justice literature. It suggests that procedural fairness has greater appeal and 
more positive effects on individuals.  
 
Payment Compliance 
 
Taxpayers are supposed to lodge their AS and, at the same time, pay any amount of taxes 
they owe according to their AS. However, sometimes taxpayers lodge their AS, indicating 
a debit amount, but fail to pay in time. Thus, taxpayers who lodge their AS may yet 
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comply or fail to comply in terms of the payment required. We investigated whether this 
form of compliance was affected by the experimental conditions. However, naturally, the 
sample for these analyses was strongly reduced, namely to those who lodged their AS and 
owed taxes according to that statement (N = 645). 
 
First, a hierarchical log-linear model for the binary payment compliance variable, right, 
letter and entity type yielded a non-significant four-way interaction, L.R. χ2(4) = 3.94, ns. 
Entity type, thus, did not substantially moderate the effect and further analyses were 
conducted for all valid cases together. 
 
A logistic regression for payment compliance included as background variables the four 
categorical variables of lodgment history (Sep00, Dec00, Mar01 and Jun01), registration 
with tax agent for AS purposes (AgentAS), registration with tax agent for income tax 
purposes (AgentIT) and mail-out batch. In addition, the amount of taxes owed was 
included as a control (AS Net Tax). Age, gender and business age did not apply to all 
entities and were not included. The main effects of letter and right were tested in the first 
step, their interaction in the second step.  
 
Consistent across both steps, lodgment history had little predictive value for payment 
compliance. While AgentAS had also no significant relationship to payment compliance, 
AgentIT showed a significant effect (see Table 7). Interestingly, different from the findings 
for lodgment compliance, clients who were registered with a tax agent were less compliant 
in terms of timely payments. Batch had also a significant effect, as we would expect. 
Recipients of the first batch of reminder letters had a higher compliance rate. The amount 
of taxes to be paid was unrelated to the level of compliance. The factors right and letter had 
overall no significant main or interaction effects. However, a single comparison within the 
interaction was statistically significant. Namely, consistent with H3, a letter with a match 
between informational right and informational treatment yielded a relatively higher rate of 
compliance (B = 1.37, p = 0.014). However, the corresponding effect for an interpersonal 
letter matching an interpersonal right was not significant, inconsistent with H3. 
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Table 7: Logistic regression for payment compliance (individuals and non-individual 
entities) 
 
  B S.E. Wald df p 
Step1 AgentAS -0.435 0.545 0.636 1 ns 
 AgentIT -1.115 0.335 11.085 1 0.001 
 Batch -0.424 0.182 5.427 1 0.020 
 AS Net Tax -0.000 0.000 0.028 1 ns 
 Sep00   2.589 3 ns 
  Sep00(1) -0.498 0.541 0.849 1 ns 
  Sep00(2) -0.099 0.284 0.122 1 ns 
  Sep00(3) -0.509 0.515 0.980 1 ns 
 Dec00   5.193 3 ns 
  Dec00(1) -1.436 0.965 2.211 1 ns 
  Dec00(2) -0.496 0.251 3.905 1 0.048 
  Dec00(3) -0.234 0.384 0.372 1 ns 
 Mar01   3.258 3 ns 
  Mar01(1) -1.188 0.974 1.487 1 ns 
  Mar01(2) -0.067 0.217 0.096 1 ns 
  Mar01(3) -0.425 0.307 1.910 1 ns 
 Jun01   0.076 3 ns 
  Jun01(1) -0.168 1.767 0.009 1 ns 
  Jun01(2) -0.006 0.200 0.001 1 ns 
  Jun01(3) -0.082 0.319 0.066 1 ns 
 Letter   0.566 2 ns 
  Letter(1) -0.144 0.221 0.423 1 ns 
  Letter(2) -0.147 0.226 0.425 1 ns 
 Right   0.525 2 ns 
  Right(1) -0.159 0.220 0.525 1 ns 
  Right(2) -0.070 0.221 0.102 1 ns 
 Constant -1.206 0.465 6.733 1 0.009 
Step 2 …      
 Letter * Right   6.918 4 ns 
  Letter(1) by Right(1) -1.373 0.560 6.001 1 0.014 
  Letter(1) by Right(2) -0.301 0.538 0.313 1 ns 
  Letter(2) by Right(1) -0.360 0.549 0.430 1 ns 
  Letter(2) by Right(2) -0.025 0.558 0.002 1 ns 
 Constant -1.418 0.516 7.542 1 0.006 
 
A cross-tabulation of payment compliance for the experimental conditions illuminates the 
finding (however, not accounting for background variables). The association between letter 
and payment compliance was close to significant only when an informational right was 
made salient, χ2(2) = 5.83, p = 0.054. With an informational right being salient, the 
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compliance rate for a matching informational letter was 81.9% compared to only 63.5% for 
the standard letter (interpersonal letter: 72.5%). Or, looked at from a different angle, the 
association between right and payment compliance was only significant for an 
informational letter, χ2(2) = 6.82, p = 0.033. With an informational letter, the compliance 
rate was 81.9% when an informational right was made salient, but only 62.8% when no 
right was made salient (interpersonal right: 72.5%). 
 
This finding stands in stark contrast with the interaction reported earlier for lodgment 
compliance of non-individual entities. To clarify the situation, payment compliance was 
subjected to separate cross-tabulations for individual and non-individual entities, even 
though the earlier log-linear model did not suggest a significant moderation effect of entity 
type. In fact, with informational rights being salient, the three letter types did not differ 
significantly from each other for non-individual entities, χ2(2) = 1.94, ns; however, they 
differed significantly for individuals, χ2(2) = 9.18, p = 0.010, similar to the earlier overall 
analysis. Namely, with informational rights made salient, the informational letter yielded a 
compliance rate of 87.8% compared to 57.1% for the standard letter (interpersonal letter: 
64.4%). Hence, the interaction effect held in particular for individuals. 
 
Summary. Payment compliance data indicated a positive effect of a reminder letter that 
realised informational fairness and at the same time referred taxpayers to their right to 
informational fairness, as granted in the Taxpayers’ Charter. However, this effect appeared 
to hold only for individual clients, not for non-individual entities. Thus, again there was a 
positive effect of procedural fairness on individual clients, but a different combination of 
letter message and salient right was responsible than was the case for lodgment 
compliance. 
 
Discussion 
 
The present study investigated the effects of procedural justice principles in lodgment 
reminder letters on (1) the quantity and quality of client phone calls, (2) compliance in 
terms of lodging AS without much further delay, and (3) compliance in terms of paying the 
taxes owed without much further delay. The predictions were that (H1) reminder letters 
 25
incorporating principles of informational or interpersonal justice in their messages would 
make clients react more favourably towards the reminder and increase compliance; (H2) 
reminder letters referring to taxpayers’ entitlements to informational and interpersonal 
fairness would lead to more favourable responses and greater compliance; and (H3) justice 
principles in the letter message matching salient entitlements would elicit the most positive 
responses and greatest levels of compliance.  
 
Overall, the evidence for these hypotheses was rather mixed, as the following brief 
summary discussion for each hypothesis shows. Regarding hypothesis H1, the quantity of 
phone calls showed fewer phone calls for the informational letter, but more phone calls for 
the interpersonal letter, compared to the standard letter. The evidence is thus inconsistent. 
However, not only is the mere number of phone calls ambiguous in its meaning (as 
discussed earlier), but the (marginal significant) effect also applies only to the comparison 
between the two fair letters, while the standard letter fell in between. So, each procedurally 
fair letter did not attract a significantly different number of phone calls than the standard 
letter. The quality of phone calls did not provide any evidence in favour of H1. Data of 
lodgment compliance of individuals, in contrast, yielded empirical support, with the two 
fair letters producing greater levels of compliance than the standard letter. The same, 
however, was not true for non-individual entities. Also, the data for payment compliance 
provided no evidence. 
 
For hypothesis H2, the phone call data yielded partly supportive evidence, insofar as letters 
that referred to informational rights yielded a somewhat lower number of 
excuses/assurances and a lower number of requests for delays. However, the outcome of 
letters that referred to the right to interpersonally fair treatment fell in between the other 
two conditions and was not different from the no salient right condition. Further, it may be 
argued that these two categories of phone calls are also ambiguous in their meaning. 
Certainly, excuses or requests for delay indicate a sub-optimal level of compliance. Then 
again, it would be preferable for the Tax Office to be contacted by their clients who are 
courteous or cooperative enough to make excuses, assurances or requests for delays, rather 
than simply not lodging or paying their taxes.  
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For individuals, the lodgment compliance data did not yield any evidence for H2; however, 
for non-individual entities there was a main effect partly consistent with the hypothesis. 
That is, the letter referring to a right to interpersonally fair treatment yielded greater 
compliance than the other two right conditions. The informational right condition, 
however, did not produce more compliance than the no right condition. Moreover, there 
was no support for a main effect of granting rights to fair treatment in the payment 
compliance data. 
 
As to hypothesis H3, which, if valid, would in fact supersede the two earlier hypotheses, 
the phone data yielded partial evidence for the category of accusations or blame. When an 
informational right was made salient, a matching informational letter led to fewer calls that 
accused or blamed the Tax Office. This finding is of particular interest, because 
accusations and blame are clearly negative outcomes for the Tax Office, reflecting 
dissatisfaction and the questioning of the performance and legitimacy of the Tax Office. 
However, an interpersonal letter matching an interpersonal right was no better than the 
standard letter, inconsistent with H3. While requests for information were more frequent 
when informational letter and informational right coincided, this result is again ambiguous 
in its meaning. As with the mere number of phone calls, a higher number of information 
requests need not be a bad outcome, because it might signal that clients perceive the Tax 
Office as a point of contact, a source of advice and a cooperative partner. Or, in our 
specific case, it could signal that clients indeed took the Tax Office’s commitment to 
informational justice seriously. 
 
The findings for the payment lodgment data mirrored the positive phone call evidence. 
When an informational right was made salient, an informational letter yielded a 
significantly greater level of compliance than the other two letters. An informational letter 
that matched the salient informational right exceeded the standard letter by close to 20% 
compliance. However, this effect held only for individual entities; and here the letter 
matching informational treatment with the salient right yielded a compliance rate about 30 
percentage points higher than for the standard letter. In contrast to this finding, the same 
condition of matching informational letter and right decreased lodgment compliance of 
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non-individual entities; the compliance rate here was about 10 percentage points lower 
than for the standard letter. 
 
On the whole, the supportive evidence was rather scattered across the different outcome 
measures, and sometimes weak and only marginally significant. All three hypotheses 
received some empirical support, even though the evidence was far from conclusive. 
Importantly, however, there was only one finding that clearly contradicted the predictions; 
namely, for non-individual entities, the combination of informational right and 
corresponding letter was associated with lower lodgment compliance. It might be the case 
that more professional or experienced tax clients had higher standards as to the information 
and explanations the Tax Office should provide in their communications. Therefore they 
might have been dissatisfied with the Tax Office’s realisation of its expressed commitment 
to informational rights.  
 
It is thus important to note that the alternative letters evaluated in this study, different or 
unusual as they may appear to tax administrators, did not produce a backlash in terms of 
bewildered phone calls or other negative reactions. If anything, the evidence rather 
suggests that they tended to reduce negative phone calls and non-compliance. Overall, 
however, procedurally fair letter messages seemed to have greater impact on individual 
clients, with fair letters leading to greater lodgment compliance and, when informational 
treatment corresponded to the salient right, to greater payment compliance. 
 
The findings for the control variables are also worth a brief discussion. First, the level of 
previous lodgment compliance was a strong predictor for lodgment compliance of 
individual as well as non-individual entities. In other words, part of the variance in 
lodgment compliance was stable over time. However, it remains unclear from the present 
study why this was the case. It could be that taxpayers have enduring tax schemas that 
determine taxpaying decisions (Roth, Scholz & Witte, 1989); a set of attitudes and beliefs 
as to ethics, risks, the tax system, the government, and so on, that are learnt, socialised and 
generalised from experience, and thus stable across situations. Alternatively, taxpayers 
may simply have bad or good habits (of record-keeping and so on) or more or less skills in 
dealing with their finances and taxes that cannot be easily unlearnt or learnt, respectively. 
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Or, it might be the case that the objective circumstances differ between taxpayers, making 
compliance easy for some but hard and complex for others. In any case, the apparent level 
of stability in compliance levels implies that one-shot approaches, such as the intervention 
tested in the present study has been one so far, would be unlikely to achieve major changes 
in compliance levels. The present study could at best provide some limited indications for 
the general effectiveness of the approach, but to have a major impact more concerted 
actions would be required, involving a consistent set of actions pulling in the same 
direction. 
 
Second, lodgment compliance and payment compliance seemed to be qualitatively 
different from each other. Results showed that people’s history of lodgment compliance 
was unrelated to their payment compliance. Likewise, the effects of being registered with a 
tax agent for income tax purposes was diametrically opposed for the two forms of 
compliance; tax agent cases were more compliant in terms of lodgment than self-preparers, 
but less compliant in terms of payment. Also, the effects of the experimental manipulations 
differed between the two forms of compliance. It is unclear, however, what the crucial 
difference between lodgment and payment compliance is. While lodgment compliance 
showed some stability over time, any account of it in terms of more general tax schemas 
does not seem to extend to payment compliance. If attitudes, habits or objective 
circumstances played a role, these would seem to be specific to different forms of 
compliance. The opposite effects on lodgment and payment compliance of being registered 
with a tax agent are difficult to explain, in particular as these tax agents were not supposed 
to help with the preparation of the AS. Nonetheless, it could be the case that tax agents 
provide multiple services that could affect levels of compliance differently (Roth et al., 
1989). For instance, their help in collecting all the necessary information and completing 
the forms could be conducive to lodgment compliance, while their advice on the (low) 
risks of not paying taxes instantly could be detrimental to payment compliance. This, 
however, remains speculation, considering also the fact that taxpayers’ decision to seek 
help from tax agents might itself be influenced by, and thus confounded with, factors that 
could account for the observed effects. 
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Third, the effects of age and gender on individuals’ lodgment compliance are consistent 
with much earlier research showing that women tend to be more compliant than men, and 
older people more compliant than younger people (Roth et al., 1989; Tittle, 1980; Wenzel, 
in press). 
 
Conclusions 
 
The present study yielded some, but largely patchy, evidence for the assumption that 
procedural justice principles in reminder letters improve levels of compliance with the 
reminders. The two procedurally fair letters increased lodgment compliance of individuals; 
the granting of a right to interpersonal fairness led to greater lodgment compliance of non-
individual entities; and providing informational justice while expressly granting taxpayers 
the right to informational justice was beneficial to payment compliance of individuals. 
There was only one negative effect, namely of the latter combination of informational right 
and treatment on lodgment compliance of non-individuals. At the same time, the phone 
data did not suggest any adverse effects of the approach. On the contrary, if anything, the 
combination of granting and actually providing informational justice decreased accusations 
and blame taxpayers voiced towards the Tax Office. Even though the research did not 
provide conclusive evidence, it certainly encourages further attempts in this direction; 
attempts that could be generally bolder, involving stronger messages and repeated 
communications signalling the Tax Office’s commitment to procedural fairness.  
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Appendix 
Informational Justice Letter / Informational Right Salient 
 
 
Your activity statement is now overdue 
 
Our records show that you have not lodged your completed activity statement for the period: 
1 July 2001 to 30 September 2001 
By now you should have completed and returned your activity statement by the due date (shown 
on the top right-hand corner of your activity statement) and paid any amount owing. 
There are penalties for not lodging on time, and you may be liable for interest charges if you have 
payments outstanding. The Activity Statement Instructions booklet explains the different ways to 
pay any amounts due. 
If you have lodged and paid in the last five working days, or made alternative arrangements with 
us, please disregard this letter. 
Why are we sending you this letter?  
It is our responsibility to collect tax payable under the law. Taxes fund community services and 
support for all Australians. We have to ensure that everyone meets their obligations under the tax 
laws so that those who correctly lodge their returns and pay their taxes are not disadvantaged by 
those who do not.  
 
Why can’t we be more specific in this letter?  
We do not know why you have not lodged your activity statement so we cannot give you more 
specific information in this letter. However if you: 
 need to make alternative arrangements to pay any amount owing, 
 lodged and paid more than five working days ago, or 
 think you do not need to complete the activity statement and do not owe any amount, 
please call us on 1300 139 028, and have your tax file number and activity statement handy. 
 
Why do we impose penalties?  
Without taxes, our society could not afford essential services such as roads, health and education. 
While most people readily comply with the tax laws, a penalty system needs to be in place for 
cases where a willingness to comply is missing. 
 
If you have any questions or need help completing your activity statement: 
 refer to the Activity Statement Instructions (phone 1300 720 092 for a copy), 
 visit www.taxreform.ato.gov.au, or 
 phone 13 24 78. 
 
 
E Holland 
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION AND 
DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You have a right to have ATO decisions 
about your tax affairs explained to you. 
 
This is one of your rights and obligations as outlined in the 
Taxpayers' Charter.   You can obtain a copy of the Taxpayers' 
Charter  by visiting www.ato.gov.au or by calling 1300 720 092. 
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Interpersonal Justice Letter / Interpersonal Right Salient 
 
 
Your activity statement is now overdue 
 
Our records show that you have not lodged your completed activity statement for the period: 
1 July 2001 to 30 September 2001 
By now you should have completed and returned your activity statement by the due date (shown 
on the top right-hand corner of your activity statement) and paid any amount owing. 
There are penalties for not lodging on time, and you may be liable for interest charges if you have 
payments outstanding. The Activity Statement Instructions booklet explains the different ways to 
pay any amounts due. 
If you have lodged and paid in the last five working days, or made alternative arrangements with 
us, please disregard this letter. 
We believe in your honesty 
We assume you try to deal honestly with your tax affairs, and understand that you may have 
good reasons for not lodging your activity statement. However, if you: 
 need to make alternative arrangements to pay any amount owing,  
 lodged and paid more than five working days ago, or 
 think you do not need to complete the activity statement and do not owe any amount, 
please call us on 1300 139 028, and have your tax file number and activity statement handy. 
 
We acknowledge that times can be difficult 
We realise that it is not always easy to fulfil your tax obligations, and there may be some reason 
why this is a difficult time for you. We also understand that you may have simply forgotten to 
complete or lodge your activity statement. However, we need to ensure that everyone meets their 
obligations under the tax laws, and would like to remind you that you lodge your activity statement 
as soon as possible. 
 
We do not want to make things more difficult for you 
There are penalties for not lodging on time, and you may be liable for interest charges if you 
have payments outstanding. We are sorry if penalties add to any difficulties you may already 
be experiencing, but we trust you will understand the need for such a penalty system. 
 
If you have any questions or need help completing your activity statement: 
 check the Activity Statement Instructions (phone 1300 720 092 for a copy), 
 visit the tax reform website at www.taxreform.ato.gov.au, or 
 phone 13 24 78 for more information. 
 
 
E Holland 
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION AND 
DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You have a right to be treated by the ATO 
with courtesy, consideration and respect. 
  
This is one of your rights and obligations as outlined in the 
Taxpayers' Charter.  You can obtain a copy of the Taxpayers' 
Charter  by visiting www.ato.gov.au or by calling 1300 720 092. 
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Standard Letter / No Salient Right  
 
 
Your activity statement is now overdue 
 
Our records show that you have not lodged your completed activity statement for the period: 
1 July 2001 to 30 September 2001 
By now you should have completed and returned your activity statement by the due date (shown 
on the top right-hand corner of your activity statement) and paid any amount owing. 
 
There are penalties for not lodging on time, and you may be liable for interest charges if you have 
payments outstanding. The Activity Statement Instructions booklet explains the different ways to 
pay any amounts due. 
 
If you have lodged and paid in the last five working days, or made alternative arrangements with 
us, please disregard this letter. However, if you: 
 need to make alternative arrangements to pay any amount owing,  
 lodged and paid more than five working days ago, or 
 think you do not need to complete the activity statement and do not owe any amount, 
please call us on 1300 139 028, and have your tax file number and activity statement handy. 
 
If you have any questions, or need help completing your activity statement: 
 refer to the Activity Statement Instructions (phone 1300 720 092 for a copy), 
 visit www.taxreform.ato.gov.au, or 
 phone 13 24 78. 
 
 
 
E Holland 
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION AND 
DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION 
The Taxpayers' Charter outlines your rights and obligations under the 
law as well as the service and standards you can expect when dealing 
with the ATO. You can obtain a copy of the Taxpayers' Charter by 
visiting www.ato.gov.au or by calling 1300 720 092. 
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